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We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts, when there is incomplete information on the licensee’s 
valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensee’s development efforts.  A licensing contract typically contains an 
upfront payment, milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase, and royalties on sales.  We use principal-agent 
models to formulate the licensor’s contracting problem and we find that under adverse selection, the optimal contract structure 
changes with the licensee’s valuation of the innovation.  As the licensee’s valuation increases, the licensor’s optimal level of 
involvement in the development – directly or through royalties – should decrease.  Only a risk-averse licensor should include both 
upfront and milestone payments.  Moral hazard alone is not detrimental to the licensor’s value, but may create an additional value 
loss when combined with adverse selection.  Our results inform managerial practice about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different terms included in licensing contracts and recommend the optimal composition of the contract. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Licensing deals are becoming more prevalent in a variety of R&D-intensive industries.  In the 
pharmaceutical industry, for instance, many biotechnology companies develop their R&D projects up to 
proof of principle and then look for a large pharmaceutical industry partner.  Soaring drug development 
costs imply that smaller biotech companies may not have the financial and organizational capabilities to 
fully develop new drugs.  Large pharmaceutical companies, however, do have the financial means and the 
marketing clout to successfully bring the products to market.  They are also under pressure to introduce 
new products to sustain their sales and, in recent years, their internal pipelines have sometimes been 
inadequate, prompting demand for in-licensing opportunities.  This increasing demand for in-licensing has 
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improved the biotech companies’ cash position, raising their bargaining power, and has created a seller’s 
market. 
Licensing deals are governed by contracts that specify a sequence of payments from the licensee to the 
licensor, typically in the form of an upfront payment, milestone payments upon completion of specific 
stages in the product development, and royalties on sales. During licensing negotiations, two questions may 
arise.  First, since the magnitude of these payments taken together depends on the value of the project, the 
question arises how valuable the project is.  Valuation of R&D projects is complex and subject to many 
uncertainties, both technical and commercial.  As a result, disagreements can arise between the licensor 
and licensee.  For example, in 2002, Endovasc terminated a confidentiality agreement with a 
pharmaceutical company reviewing scientific developments associated with Angiogenix, a nicotine-based 
heart treatment, amid expressions of interest from other companies and lack of progress in the discussions 
with the former company (Triangle Business Journal, 2002).  Endovasc finally received a grant from Philip 
Morris to fund their research (Market Wire, 2002).  This difference in expressed value can be real, or can 
be due to one of the negotiation partners misrepresenting their opinion in order to try and secure a more 
favorable licensing deal.  A second question is how to structure the licensing contract itself, i.e. which of 
the three types of payments should be used, and in which amounts.  The licensor and licensee can have 
different opinions of the value of each of the three types of payments, and the structure of the contract can 
influence the licensee’s behavior when further developing the product, by providing (dis)incentives to 
invest appropriately. For instance, in 2002, Neopharm terminated an agreement with Pharmacia because of 
its alleged lack of promotion of its products under license (Neopharm, 2002); in 2005, Gilead claimed that 
Roche underperformed at both manufacturing and promoting Tamiflu (Gilead, 2005); and recently, Nektar 
of San Carlos, California, accused Pfizer of a poor marketing job after Pfizer decided to withdraw the in-
licensed insulin inhaler Exubera, resulting in one of the pharmaceutical industry’s costliest failures ever 
(Wall Street Journal, 2007). 
This research is inspired by a problem that was brought to our attention by Phytopharm, a pharmaceutical 
development and functional food company based in Cambridgeshire, UK, which was starting negotiations 
for the licensing of one of its products and required a model to value the project and to facilitate the 
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negotiations (Crama et al, 2007).  A major difficulty in reaching an agreement was a disagreement 
concerning the likelihood of technical success of the product, i.e. the probability that the product will 
successfully pass all the required clinical trials and obtain approval for launching the product on the 
market. This likelihood of technical success directly influences the value of the product, and therefore the 
magnitude of the payments specified in the contract. Additionally, differences in PTS estimates also result 
in different valuations for each of the three types of payments, and may influence the licensee’s behavior, 
over which the licensor only has limited control after granting the license.  In this paper, we present a 
model to aid a licensor to optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the 
licensee’s valuation for the product, focusing on disagreements on the probability of technical success 
(PTS), and limited control over the licensee’s development efforts. We will use the model to derive 
insights on which contract structures are appropriate in different situations of information asymmetry and 
control over the licensee’s actions. 
We model the problem as follows.  The licensor offers to out-license an R&D project, consisting of a 
sequence of research phases, each with a probability of technical success (PTS).  Both the licensor (he) and 
the licensee (she) make an estimate of the PTS, based on their own experience.  The licensor does not 
know the licensee’s estimate of the PTS, but has an idea of the range in which it could be.  The licensor 
and licensee also share information regarding the required development costs and sales estimates.  The 
licensor proposes a contract which typically contains an upfront payment at contract signature, milestone 
payments after successful completion of a research phase, and a royalty rate specified as a percentage of 
sales.  The problem essentially is whether each of these contract elements should be included in the 
contract, and how high each payment should be, in order for the licensor to obtain the maximum value out 
of the licensing agreement.  After contract signature, the licensee will spend resources and money to further 
develop and market the project.  It is standard practice in the pharmaceutical industry to invest in pre-
launch marketing and construction of dedicated production facilities in order to enable fast sales growth. 
Our contributions are fourfold.  First, we present a licensing problem in which we explicitly allow for 
different priors regarding the projects’ PTS.  To the best of our knowledge, this problem in licensing 
contract design has not yet been explored in the literature.  There are several reasons why a licensor and 
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licensee could have different PTS estimates.  For instance, pharmaceutical companies may use their own 
in-house expertise to make PTS estimates based on the project data rather than rely on the licensor’s 
estimates.  As Macho-Stadler et al. (1996, p44) point out, “the licensee is in some cases better acquainted 
with […] the application of the innovation to his productive process.”  The estimates may differ as the 
experts adjust them to the specificities of the project and the company’s own expertise in the field.  In 
situations where the licensee is a non-pharmaceutical company, it may have limited knowledge about the 
project, and might therefore be wary of the estimates presented by the licensor, preferring their own, 
typically more conservative, estimates.  Since the PTS estimate has a major impact on the project’s value, 
we also have to consider the licensee’s incentive to understate her estimate, in order to impose more 
favorable contract terms.  Therefore, we study how the licensor can optimally design licensing contracts in 
the face of hidden information concerning the licensee’s project valuation, which creates a problem of 
adverse selection.  Using a contract theory framework, we develop a principal-agent model with the 
licensor as a principal.  We also incorporate hidden action in the form of incomplete information 
concerning the licensee’s efforts to market the product, giving rise to moral hazard. 
Second, we use a richer contract structure than commonly studied in the literature, where many screening 
contracts are two-part tariffs, containing a fixed fee and a variable component.  In accordance with 
observed business practice, we include a milestone payment as an additional contract element, creating a 
three-part tariff, and analyze its effect on the principal’s ability to contract.  A milestone payment is a fixed 
fee, but unlike the upfront payment, its valuation may differ for the licensor and the licensee as well as 
between licensees holding different PTS estimates.  We investigate whether this allows the licensor to use 
the milestone payment as an instrument to screen the licensee and whether it confers an advantage over the 
classic two-part tariff.   
Third, we obtain a number of managerial insights for designing optimal licensing contracts.  We find that, 
although in practice a licensor often prefers an upfront payment to royalties, this can be detrimental to his 
value.  Even a risk-averse licensor should not necessarily sell the project for an upfront payment only; if he 
has a higher valuation than the licensee, he should prefer at least some amount to be paid at project 
completion.  We show that adverse selection puts a stronger emphasis on payments at project completion in 
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the licensor’s optimal contract.  Moral hazard does not have a detrimental effect on the licensor’s value, 
unless it is compounded by adverse selection.  The licensor’s risk-attitude determines the structure of the 
contract: only a risk-averse licensor should offer a contract with both an upfront and a milestone payment. 
Finally, this is a real problem of practical importance for licensing deals in the pharmaceutical industry.  
Our model can be used to explain observed contracts in practice.  We propose one possible explanation for 
the presence of the different elements in licensing contracts, upfront payment, milestone payment and 
royalty rate.  Indeed, Phytopharm felt that many factors, such as their risk-aversion and the licensee’s 
valuation of the project, would influence the contract structure, but was not sure how to take them into 
account in their offer.   
Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on innovation and licensing in economics and management 
science.  Section 3 describes the model and notation used throughout the paper.  Section 4 presents the 
solution to the licensor’s contract design problem under different assumptions of available information 
concerning the licensee’s project valuation and marketing effort.  In section 5, we conclude with the 
managerial insights that can be drawn from our analytical results and explore avenues for future research.  
All the proofs and derivations are available in the online appendix to this paper. 
2.  Literature review 
Adverse selection and moral hazard problems are studied in many different areas, such as marketing 
(Bergen et al., 1992; Desai and Srinivasan, 1995), regulation economics (Laffont, 1994) and labor markets 
(Prendergast, 1999).  A general review of information economics can be found in Stiglitz (2000).  
However, in this section we focus on some of the relevant papers in the literature on innovation and 
licensing.  A first stream of research focuses on the socially optimal exploitation of innovation and the 
impact of licensing contracts on the incentive to innovate.  Tandon (1982) analyzes the optimal patent 
length and compulsory licensing to prevent monopolies without destroying the incentive to innovate.  
Shapiro (1985) finds that licensing increases social welfare by disseminating the innovation’s benefits and 
the inventor’s incentive to innovate by generating revenues.  Aghion and Tirole (1994) present a 
contractual model of R&D activities conducted by two different agents and analyze the allocation of 
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property rights.  They show that the allocation of ownership depends on (a) the impact of the party’s effort 
on the project value and (b) the ex-ante bargaining power, or the intellectual property right to the research 
idea.  The authors prove under which conditions the parties’ private optimum coincides with the social 
optimum. 
Several researchers have evaluated the conditions under which it is beneficial for an innovator to license 
his technology.  The model in Katz and Shapiro (1985) recognizes the effect on the licensing decision of 
the innovation’s impact and the firms’ relative efficiency, using a fixed fee contract.  Rockett (1990) 
studies an incumbent with two potential entrants of different abilities and enumerates the conditions under 
which the innovator will license, against a fixed fee, to either both competitors, one competitor or none.  
Her research illustrates the strategic use of know-how by the incumbent to proactively prevent entry from 
competitors.  Her findings are revisited by Yi (1998), who finds that it is always in the licensor’s interest to 
license to the company that has the better ability to incorporate the innovation, if a two-part contract is 
possible.  Amit et al. (1990) show that, besides the real need for financing, risk-averse entrepreneurs are 
interested to sell their venture to a venture capitalist in order to share the risk.  Risk sharing is also the 
driving force behind licensing contracts in Bousquet et al. (1998).  Hill (1992) lists the many dimensions 
that influence the innovator’s decision to license, such as the speed of imitation, the importance of first-
mover advantages, and the transaction costs of licensing.  Further factors include competitive intensity, the 
number of capable competitors, the rent-yielding potential of the innovation, the height of barriers to 
imitation and cash flow considerations.  An additional reason for licensing may be to impose the new 
technology in the industry (Gallini, 1984; Shepard, 1987). 
The structure of the contract offered by the innovator has also been studied.  Both Katz and Shapiro (1986) 
and Kamien and Tauman (1986) present the optimal licensing contracting strategy for an innovator after 
innovation has occurred.  In Katz et al. (1986), the innovator uses an auction system with a fixed number of 
licenses available.  The authors then compare the innovator’s selling price to the social optimum.  Kamien 
et al. (1986) allow the innovator to pursue the following strategies: enter the market himself, license for a 
fixed fee contract or for a contract consisting of royalties.  The authors find that the innovator prefers to 
offer a fixed fee contract to a limited number of companies rather than a royalties contract. 
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Only few of the above papers assume that some uncertain R&D activities are still to be completed, such as 
Aghion et al. (1994) or Amit et al. (1990).  If one of the parties has to execute remaining R&D activities, 
the licensing contract structure gains additional importance as an incentive tool.  Dayanand and Padman 
(2001) show that for projects with certain activities, the timing and the amount of the milestone payments 
influence the subcontractor’s preferred project execution.  Whang (1992) models the incentive problem for 
uncertain projects and presents an optimal contract that guarantees that the subcontractor’s optimal project 
execution is equal to the principal’s optimal execution. 
Whereas many of these papers assume that there is no informational asymmetry, the above-mentioned 
paper by Amit et al. (1990) includes pre-contractual information asymmetry leading to problems of adverse 
selection: only the entrepreneurs with relatively lower skills sell out to venture capitalists.  Gallini and 
Wright (1990) present a model in which the innovator signals his private knowledge of the quality of his 
innovation through adapted contracts in which a good innovator accepts to be paid partially in royalties 
whereas a bad innovator demands a fixed fee.  Beggs (1992) similarly concludes that the licensee can offer 
royalties in order to signal his valuation of the innovation in the presence of informational asymmetries.  
Thursby et al. (2005) explore a licensing model for the development and marketing of university research 
under different assumptions of moral hazard and adverse selection, and propose adequate contract terms to 
deal with each situation, including upfront payments, milestone payments and royalties, joint research 
cooperation and annual payments.  Other papers justifying the inclusion of royalties in the optimal contract 
because of moral hazard include Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Macho-Stadler et al. (1996).  These papers 
assume an objective, shared valuation of the project.   
A fundamental difference of the problem studied in this paper with the literature is that we consider 
situations in which the licensor and the licensee do not necessarily agree on the PTS of the R&D project 
and therefore its value.  A similar issue can be found in supply chain management, where the buyer may 
have incomplete information on the quality of the provided products or services.  This problem is typically 
tackled using a combination of warranties, price rebates and quality inspection (Baiman et al., 2000, 2001; 
Lim, 2001; Iyer et al., 2005).  Unfortunately, these mechanisms are difficult to implement for R&D 
projects.  Inspection is only useful when a large number of products is delivered, rather than a single 
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project, and warranties on pharmaceutical projects do not make a lot of sense since failure is typically the 
most likely outcome, and not an exception. 
We choose the licensor as the principal because we have observed (Crama et al, 2007) that the licensor 
typically has bargaining power and initiates negotiations with several partners, offering a unique project 
protected by intellectual property rights, giving him monopoly power.  In addition, the growing maturity of 
the biotech industry coupled with the increasing demand for in-licensing has increased the bargaining 
power of the licensor, a fact which is reflected in the value of recent deals (Wall Street Journal, 2006; 
Financial Times, 2006). 
3.  Model Description 
The licensor’s contract design problem is modeled using a principal-agent framework with hidden 
information and hidden action, in which the licensor is the principal.  The timing of the contract 
negotiations is as follows (see Figure 1).  After the licensee receives the project information from the 
licensor, including the project scope, cost, timing, and results from previous R&D phases, she forms her 
PTS estimate of the project, ep , defining her type.  Then the licensor offers a contract to the licensee, and 
if the licensee accepts the contract, the project is executed.  During execution, the licensee performs a 
variety of demand-enhancing activities, the magnitude of which is denoted by x .  The licensee makes the 
payments to the licensor as specified in the contract, depending on the project’s development and 
commercial success.  In this paper, we consider a project that only contains a single research phase, which 
is sufficient to observe the trade-off between a certain, upfront payment, and uncertain future payments in 
the form of a milestone payment or a royalty. 
Figure 1.  Timeline of project negotiations 
Licensee forms 
estimate ep , 
determining her type 
Licensor offers contract with 
upfront payment, milestone 
payment, and royalties 
Licensee accepts or refuses 
contract.  If she accepts, 
payment of upfront fee
Project is executed: 
licensee performs 
effort x
Licensor evaluates project 
and shares information 
with licensee 
Project proves successful: 
licensee pays milestone 
payment
Project is launched: 
licensee pays 
royalties on sales 
time 
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A.  The Generic Principal-Agent Model 
We will first introduce the generic principal-agent model, and then show how it can be applied and 
modified to our situation.  Consider the following model notation: 
⊂Θ∈θ  Agent’s type, unknown to the principal, belonging to support Θ , a 
continuous interval in  . 
( ) ( )θθ fF ,  Cumulative distribution and probability density function of agent’s type. 
( ) nigi ,...,1,: =→Θ θ  Contract terms, eg: product quality and price ( 2=n ), potentially 
dependent on the agent’s type, continuous with a finite number of 
discontinuities in the first derivative. 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }θθθ nggT ,...,1=  Contract function, a vector of contract term functions; principal’s 
decision variable. 
Θ∈ν  Agent’s revealed type, belonging to support Θ , revealed to the principal 
by the choice of contract by the agent; agent’s decision variable. 
∈x  Agent’s action; agent’s decision variable. 
( )( )xTu P ,θ  Principal’s utility function. 
( )( )θθ ,, xTu A  Agent’s utility function. 
( )θAu  Agent’s reservation utility. 
Let us introduce a clarifying example of the notation of the principal-agent model, in which the principal is 
an employer, and the agent an employee.  Assume two types of employees: efficient ( Hθ ) and inefficient 
( Lθ ) employees. The employer can offer contracts specifying a fixed salary ( 1g ) and an outcome-based 
remuneration as a percentage of profit ( 2g ).  The fixed salary and outcome-based remuneration form the 
contract T  ( 2=n ).  For example, the employer can choose to offer a contract offering a base salary only, 
{ }%0,10 12111 === ggT , as well as an outcome-based contract, { }%10,6 22212 === ggT .  Dependent 
on her type, the employee will choose the contract that maximizes her profit. 
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The principal-agent model is an optimization over functions.  The principal’s optimization over contract 
functions is subject to the agent’s optimal reaction to those contract functions.  The principal chooses a 
contract function designed to appeal differently to varying agent’s types.  This contract function is an input 
for the agent to maximize her value.  The agent chooses to disclose a type, ν , which determines the 
contract terms she is offered, and also chooses an action, x .  The principal anticipates the agent’s optimal 
reaction to the contract function, *ν  and *x , and incorporates it as a constraint in his maximization 
problem as seen below. 
(1) 
 
(2) 
(3) 
( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ]
( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )θθθθνθ
θνθθνθ
θθν
ν
θν
AA
A
x
P
xT
uTxTTu
xTuTxT
TxTTuE
≥Θ∈∀
∈Θ∈∀
Θ∈
,,,,:
,,maxarg,,,:
osubject  t
,,,max
**
,
**
**
,, **
  
Eq. (1) is the principal’s expected utility over all agent types, taking into account the agent’s optimal 
contract and action choice.  The feasible space is determined by the agent’s optimization problem and 
reservation utility.  Each agent type optimizes her utility by choosing the optimal contract through her 
revealed type *ν  and her optimal action *x  (Eq. 2).  If there are several alternative actions and revealed 
types which are equivalent for the agent, the principal can choose the one that maximizes his value.  An 
agent only participates in the contract if her maximum utility is higher than her reservation utility (Eq. 3). 
The revelation principle (Salanié, 1997, p17) allows us to restrict the analysis to contracts that are a direct 
truthful mechanism such that the agent reveals her type θ , or ( )( ) θθν =,* T .  This simplifies the 
principal’s optimization problem as we can reduce the agent’s optimization (Eq. 2) to the incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraints (Salanié, 1997, p17), which ensure that an agent with type θ  will obtain at 
least as much value from the contract ( )θT  than from all other contracts ( ) Θ∈νν ,T , and thus will 
choose to reveal his type θ .  The revelation principle states that any mechanism that optimizes the 
principal’s objective given the agent’s optimal behavior can be replaced with another mechanism with the 
following properties: (1) the only action the agents need to take is to reveal their type and (2) it is in the 
best interest of the agents to reveal their type truthfully.  In other words, before invoking the revelation 
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principle, an optimal mechanism ( )T  might have led some of the agents to misrepresent their type.  After 
using the revelation principle, a new optimal contract function ( )'T  is found, under which the agents’ 
optimization process leads to a truthful revelation of their type. 
The generic principal-agent model can then be formulated as follows: 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]
( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )θθθθθ
θνθθθ
θθ
ν
θ
AA
A
x
P
xT
uTxTu
xTuTx
TxTuE
≥Θ∈∀
∈Θ∈∀
Θ∈
,,,:
,,maxarg,,:
osubject  t
,,max
*
,
*
*
, *
  
Eq (4), the principal’s objective function, is identical to Eq (1), except for the substitution ( )( ) θθν =,* T  
as dictated by the revelation principle.  When maximizing his utility, the principal incorporates the agent’s 
optimal response to the contracts he proposes, modeled by the IC constraints in Eq (5).  Due to the 
revelation principle, the agent’s maximization problem can be replaced with the first-order condition for 
truthful revelation.  Eq (6) are the individual rationality (IR) constraints, ensuring the agent’s willingness to 
participate in the contract by ensuring that her utility is at least as high as her reservation utility. 
B.  The Licensing Contract Model 
We assume that the licensor is either risk-neutral or risk-averse, and that the licensee is risk-neutral.  
Biotech companies are typically risk-averse because of their limited cash reserves and project pipelines 
containing only a few drugs in development, whereas large pharmaceutical companies are well-diversified 
(Plambeck and Zenios, 2003; Thursby et al, 2005).  The licensor proposes a project to the licensee that can 
be executed at a cost c  and has an unknown PTS p .  The licensee reviews the project and evaluates 
[ ] [ ]1,0, ⊂∈ eee ppp , her subjective PTS estimate of the project, which determines her type.  The 
licensor does not know this value but knows the probability density function )( epf  and cumulative 
distribution function )( epF  on [ ]ee pp , , from which ep  is drawn.  The licensor’s estimate of the PTS is 
[ ]1,0∈op .  The licensee can also invest in demand-enhancing activities x , such as marketing and 
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promotional effort, which determine the final payoff )(xs , provided the project is successful.  The payoff 
function is concave with 0)( >xsx  and 0)( <xsxx , reflecting diminishing marginal returns.  All the cash 
flows are expressed in present value and discounted to the project’s start date. 
The licensee’s PTS estimate and thus her project valuation is her private information and is unknown to the 
licensor.  This creates hidden information or adverse selection (AS).  Thus, the licensor will have to design 
incentive-compatible contracts, which will make it unfavorable for an optimistic, or high-type, licensee to 
pretend to be a pessimistic, or low-type, licensee.  Furthermore, since the licensee’s effort x  is unknown at 
the contracting stage, the model includes hidden action, or moral hazard (MH). 
The licensor proposes a contract ( )rmmT ,, 10= , defined in terms of a contract signature fee 0m , a 
milestone payment 1m  at successful project completion, and a royalty percentage of the sales r .  He can 
also offer a menu of contracts specifying different combinations of those terms, allowing the licensee to 
choose the contract she prefers depending on her type.  This happens as follows.  The licensor can offer 
several different contracts, containing different combinations of contract elements, among which the 
licensee can choose.  For example, the licensor could offer to sell the project for an upfront payment of 10 
million without any future payments, or offer a contract including future payments, consisting of an upfront 
payment of 5 million, a milestone payment of 2 million and 5% royalties on sales.  The licensee can decide 
between those two contracts.  While the contract terms are not explicitly defined in terms of the licensee’s 
probability estimate, the valuation of the different contracts, and thus the licensee’s choice, will depend on 
the licensee’s probability estimate.  Thus the innovator can design contracts that are targeted at different 
licensee types. 
The contract terms determine how the payoff of the project is divided between the partners.  The key 
characteristic of the contract design problem is the trade-off between a certain, upfront payment and 
uncertain future payments, in the form of a milestone payment and royalties.  The cash flows are shown in 
Figure 2.  The repartition of the project value depends on the relative bargaining power of both parties.  In 
order to capture this we introduce ( ) eee upu = , the reservation utility of the licensee.  This is the minimum 
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payoff she requires in order to participate in the deal and can be considered as her opportunity cost.  We do 
not consider the reservation utility to be dependent on the licensee type as her type is specific to the project 
and not to outside opportunities (Salanié, 1997).  Furthermore, relaxing this assumption does not affect the 
qualitative results from our model, while greatly complicating the analytical exposition.  Laffont and 
Martimort (2002) illustrate the complications that arise with type-dependent reservation utilities, and 
Jullien (2000) offers a characterization of the resulting optimal contract.  A constant reservation utility is 
also in line with financial valuation theory, which recommends that management should undertake a 
project if its net present value exceeds zero.   
Figure 2.  Contract Structure 
If the licensee declares [ ]ee ppq ,∈  under a contract function ( )T , she receives a value ( )ee pqV , :  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]qmpqrxsqrppqrxqmc eee 1**0 ,1, −−+−−− , 
with ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }qmxsqrpxqmcpqrx e
x
e
10
* 1maxarg, −−+−−−= .  We write ( )( )epqrx ,*  
rather than ( )( )epqTx ,*  since the optimal effort level is only influenced by the royalty rate and not by the 
other contract elements. 
With probability ( )op−1  the licensor receives the contract signature fee 0m  only; with probability op  he 
receives a total of ( )xsrmm ++ 10 .  Thus the licensor’s total expected utility, depending on the licensee 
type, is: 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )eooeeeeeoo pmuppprxsprpmpmup 0*10 1, −+++ ,  
Licensor m0 m1 + r s(x)
Licensee -c - m0 - x -m1 + s(x)(1 - r)
po
pe 
R&D phase Market phase 
Time
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where we assume that ( )zuo  is the licensor’s Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, with 
0;0 ≤≥ ozzoz uu , and where the contract terms ( )epm0 , ( )epm1  and ( )epr  are designed for a licensee with 
PTS estimate ep .  Future sales depend on the licensee’s demand-enhancing activity ( )( )ee pprx ,* .  We 
write the sales as ( )( )( )ee pprxs ,* .   
The licensor maximizes his expected utility over the cumulative distribution function ( )epF  of the 
licensee types.  The licensor can propose a menu of contracts depending on the licensee’s PTS estimate.  
Similar to the final version of the principal-agent model, the licensor’s optimization problem is: 
(8) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )∫ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
++ ∗e
e
p
p
e
eoo
eeeeeoo
xrmm
pdF
pmup
pprxsprpmpmup
)(
)(1
,)()()(
max
0
10
,,, *10
 
(9) 
subject to 
[ ] ( )( ){ } [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]{ }xsqrqmpxqmcpprxpppp exppqeeeeee ee −+−+−−−∈∈∀ ∈ 1maxarg,,:, 10,,*  
(10) [ ]
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ] eeeeeeeee
eee
upprxsprpmppprxpmc
ppp
≥−+−+−−−
∈∀
,1,
:,
*
1
*
0
 
(11) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0;0;0:, 10 ≥≥≥∈∀ eeeeee prpmpmppp  
Eq. (9) are the IC constraints.  Under the revelation principle, we know that the contracts should be such 
that a licensee of type ep  will obtain at least as much value from the contract ( )epT  as from all other 
contracts ( ) [ ]ee ppqqT ,, ∈ .  The IC constraints ensure that optimal contract is a truthful mechanism, 
i.e. the licensee’s revealed PTS ( )( ) ee ppTq =,* .  The objective function, Eq. (8), can directly use the 
licensee’s type since Eq. (9) ensures that it is equal to her revealed type.  The contracts should also respect 
the licensee’s IR constraints, Eq. (10).  These ensure the licensee’s participation by requiring that the 
licensee’s expected value from the contract exceed her reservation utility eu .  Finally, we have the non-
negativity constraints on the contract elements typical for licensing contracts (Eq. 11). 
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Table 1.  Application of the generic principal-agent model to our licensing contract design model 
Classical Model Explanation Licensing Model 
⊂Θ∈θ  Agent’s type: a characteristic of the agent that 
determines her utility from the contract 
[ ] 10,, ≤≤≤∈ eeeee ppppp  
( ) ( )θθ fF ,  Cumulative distribution and probability density 
function of agent’s type 
( ) ( )ee pfpF ,  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }θθθ nggT ,...,1=  Contract function, vector of n  contract term 
functions, potentially dependent on the agent’s type 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }eee prpmpm ,, 10 : ( )epm0 : upfront payment 
        ( )epm1 : milestone payment  
        ( )epr : royalty rate 
Θ∈ν  Agent’s revealed type [ ]ee ppq ,∈  
∈x  Agent’s action +∈x : licensee’s effort level, it is optimal when ( ) 11 =− xespr  
( )( )xTu P ,θ  Principal’s utility from the contract with a licensee 
choosing the contract terms designed for type θ  and 
taking action x  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )eooeeeoo pmupxsprpmpmup 010 1−+++  
( )( )θθ ,, xTu A  Type θ  agent utility from the contract designed for 
type θ  when taking action x  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]eeee pmxsprppmxc 10 1 −−+−−−  
( )θAu  Type θ  agent’s reservation utility: the value of her 
outside opportunity 
eu  
( ) ( )( )( )[ ]θθθ ,, * TxTuE P  Principal’s expected utility taken over the possible licensee types, with revelation principle ( )( )( )( )( ) ( )∫ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
++e
e
p
p
e
eoo
eeeeeoo
pdF
pmup
pprxsprpmpmup
)(
)(1
,)()()(
0
*
10  
( )( ){ }
( )( ){ }θν
θθθ
ν
,,maxarg
,,:
,
*
xTu
Tx
A
xΘ∈
∈Θ∈∀
 
Agent’s incentive compatibility constraint: ensures 
that the agent chooses the contract which was 
designed for her within the menu of contracts 
[ ] ( )( ){ } [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−−
+−−−∈∈∀
∈ )()(1
)(
maxarg,,:,
1
0
,,
*
qmxsqrp
xqmc
pprxpppp e
xppq
eeeeee
ee
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )θθθθ
θ
AA uTxTu ≥
Θ∈∀
,,,
:
*
 
Agent’s individual rationality constraint: ensures the 
agent’s willingness to participate in the contract, with 
revelation principle 
[ ] ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )[ ] eeeeee
eeeeee
upprxsprpmp
pprxpmcppp
≥−+−
+−−−∈∀
,1
,:,
*
1
*
0  
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In Table 1, we show how the generic principal-agent model is modified for R&D licensing contract design 
and list the notation employed throughout the paper. 
4.  Optimal Contract Structure 
A.  No Adverse Selection 
First, we solve the problem under information symmetry, the first-best situation, to serve as a benchmark to 
the case with informational asymmetry.  In the first-best situation, the licensor knows the estimate ep  of 
the licensee and her level of investment in the demand-enhancing activities x .  Thus the model can be 
solved for each possible realization of ep  separately, making the IC constraint redundant, as each licensee 
will be presented with one contract only, as determined by her type.  The licensor selects a contract 
appropriate for the licensee’s type, ensuring that the IR constraint holds with equality, i.e., the licensee 
receives her reservation utility.  The optimal contract structure is described in Propositions 1 and 2 below.  
The proofs can be found in an online supplement to this paper. 
PROPOSITION 1.  When the licensee’s effort level is contractible, there always exists an optimal contract 
that does not contain royalties. 
We introduce the following notation: 0mz f =  is the licensor’s payoff in case of failure and 
)(10 xsrmmzs ++=  is the payoff in case of success.  The optimal solution is defined in Proposition 2.  
Using Proposition 1, we consider contracts with an upfront fee and milestone payment only.  Equivalent 
contracts with royalties can be easily determined. 
PROPOSITION 2.  If the licensor knows the licensee’s type ep  and can control her effort level x , then the 
optimal effort level ( )epx*  is determined by equating the marginal expected sales to the marginal cost of 
effort, i.e. 1=xe sp , and the licensor’s optimal contract contains the following elements: 
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• Case 1. oe pp ≥ : The optimal contract is ( )( )0,0,max,0 epm , where 
( ) ( ) ( ) eeee uxsppxcpm −+−−= **max,0  is  the maximum upfront payment that the licensee is 
willing to pay. 
• Case 2. oe pp < : If ( ) ( )
max,1
11
0 mzz
eo
zz
oe
ssf
f
uppupp == −≤−  where 
( ) ( ) ( )e
eee
e
p
uxsppxcpm −+−−=
**
max,1  is the maximum milestone payment that the licensee is 
willing to pay.  The optimal contract is ( )( )0,,0 max,1 epm . 
Otherwise, the optimal contract is ( ) ( )( )0,, *1*0 ee pmpm  such that ( ) ( ) sf zeozoe uppupp −=− 11  
and the individual rationality constraint holds. 
The derivations can be found in the online appendix.  The intuition behind these results is as follows.  If the 
licensor’s PTS estimate is lower than the licensee’s (Case 1), the licensor should choose for an upfront 
payment.  In this way, the licensor avoids all the risk, which is entirely borne by the licensee.  However, if 
the licensor’s estimate is higher than the licensee’s (Case 2), the licensor may opt for a mix of a payment at 
contract signature and a milestone payment.  The composition of the optimal contract is determined such 
that the weighted expected marginal utilities of both payments are equal.  The optimal contract contains a 
milestone payment although this exposes the licensor to risk, because the licensor values a payment at 
project completion more than the licensee believes it is worth.  This result contrasts with observations 
made by other researchers using similar models (e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p187-188), who found that 
under information symmetry, the risk-neutral party should bear all the risk if the other party is risk-averse.  
Our result is different because of the divergence in the licensor’s and licensee’s PTS estimates. 
In order to maximize his own utility, the licensor enforces an effort level x  which maximizes the value of 
the project given the type of the licensee, i.e., when the cost of an additional unit of effort is equal to the 
expected marginal sales increase.  Indeed, the licensor’s utility does not depend on sales, but only on the 
two lump sum payments.  Therefore, the higher the licensee’s value, the more the licensor can claim.  
Consequently, even if the licensor cannot control the effort level x , the licensee will choose that effort 
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level herself and the licensor can propose the same contract defined by Proposition 2 and obtain the same 
value.  In other words, moral hazard does not reduce the licensor’s value in the absence of adverse 
selection.  This finding is in line with Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p482-483) and Desai and Srinivasan (1995). 
This illustrates the superiority of a three-part tariff over a two-part tariff.  In a two-part tariff, the licensor 
obtains a future cash flow by including a royalty in the contract, which reduces the licensee’s incentive to 
invest in the demand-enhancing activity and thus decreases the project value and the licensor’s utility.  The 
three-part tariff has the advantage that the future milestone payment is a lump sum, which does not distort 
the licensee’s incentive to invest. 
Also note that, since the project value increases in ep  and the licensee only receives her reservation utility 
irrespective of her type, it is clear that the licensor’s utility is strictly increasing in the licensee’s type. 
A risk-neutral licensor, maximizing his expected net present value, should propose a contract with either an 
upfront payment or a milestone payment, but not both, unless oe pp = , when an infinite number of mixed 
optimal contracts exist.  In the online appendix, we show that: 
• Case 1. oe pp > : ( ) ( ) ( )( ) eeeee upxsppxcpm −+−−= ***0 , ( ) 0*1 =epm , ( ) 0* =epr . 
• Case 2. oe pp < : ( ) 0*0 =epm , ( ) ( ) ( )( )e
eeee
e
p
upxsppxcpm −+−−=
**
*
1 , ( ) 0* =epr . 
• Case 3. oe pp = :  ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]eeeee upxsppxcpm −+−−∈ ***0 ,0 ,  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )e
eeeee
e
p
upxsppmpxcpm −+−−−=
**
0
*
*
1 , ( ) 0* =epr . 
Note that the licensor offers the same contract irrespective of his risk attitude when oe pp > , but not when 
oe pp < .  Rewriting the risk-neutral licensor’s objective function using the IR constraint (Eq 9) to 
substitute for 0m  allows us to clarify the intuition behind the solution obtained above: 
(12) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )eeoeeee
xm
pmppupxsppxc 1, )(max1
−+−+−−   
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The first term in (12) represents the expected NPV in excess of the licensee’s reservation utility, which is 
the maximum value the licensee is willing to give to the licensor.  The second term results from the 
difference in the PTS estimates.  If the licensor is more pessimistic than the licensee (Case 1), the second 
term is negative, and the licensor will not request any milestones but completely sell the project to the 
licensee at contract signature.  However, if the licensee is more pessimistic about the project than the 
licensor, it is in the latter’s benefit to request a milestone payment (Case 2).  In that case, the licensee 
considers future milestones less likely and underestimates their value, thereby allowing a relatively higher 
payment.  Expression (12) also shows that the licensor’s optimal choice of the licensee’s effort level is set 
by maximizing the licensee’s perception of the project value, represented by the first term. 
B.  Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
In reality, the licensor will typically not know the licensee’s PTS estimate.  Hence, the licensor faces 
adverse selection and only knows the prior probability distribution of licensee types ( )epf .  The licensor 
can either offer a single contract or a menu of contracts. 
Moral hazard implies that the licensee sets her effort level *x  such as to maximize her own utility as it 
cannot be imposed as part of the contract terms.  The licensee will always set it such that such that the 
marginal expected sales accruing to the licensee equals the marginal cost of the effort, or 
( )( ) 11 =− xee sppr , which maximizes her expected value.   
B.1.  Single Contract 
For the sake of simplicity, the licensor may opt to offer a single contract, independent of the licensee type.  
In that case, the royalty rate allows the licensor to participate in the upside of contracting with a high-type 
licensee by making his revenue proportional to the project sales.  However, a high royalty rate discourages 
the licensee from investing in the project.  Therefore, the optimal royalty rate is determined by the 
equilibrium of those two forces.  The optimal contract can be characterized by four cut-off values for op  
(see appendix): 
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with maxr  such that 0
*
1
*
0 == mm  and the licensee’s IR holds; 
with 321 ppp << , epp ≤1  and epp ≥2 .  Two cases can occur: 
• Case 1. 24 pp > : 
o 1ppo ≤ : 0,0,0 **1*0 ==> rmm , with *0m  such that the IR constraint holds. 
o 21 ppp o ≤< : 0,0,0 **1*0 >=> rmm ; the optimal royalty rate increases in op . 
o 32 ppp o << : 0,0,0 **1*0 >>> rmm ; the optimal payment at contract signature decreases 
in op , in favor of the milestone payment. 
o 3ppo ≥ : 0,0,0 **1*0 >>= rmm ; the contract terms do not change with op . 
• Case 2.  24 pp ≤ :  This may occur if the licensee’s reservation utility is high. 
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o 1ppo ≤ : 0,0,0 **1*0 ==> rmm , with *0m  such that the IR constraint holds 
o 41 ppp o << : 0,0,0 **1*0 >=> rmm ; the optimal royalty rate increases in op . 
o 4ppo ≥ : 0,0,0 **1*0 >== rmm ; with max* rr = , or such that the IR constraint holds. 
A visual interpretation of the characteristics of the optimal contract depending on op  is given in Figure 3. 
The values of the cut-off probabilities on op  reflect the licensor’s attempt to balance his utility from the 
different sources of cash flow available in the contract terms, while respecting the IR constraint for the 
lowest-type licensee.  For instance, the licensor will prefer a contract with an upfront fee exclusively if his 
expected increase in value from an increase in the royalty rate, ( )( )[ ]eo pxsEp ,0* , is lower than the 
decrease in the payment at contract signature required to respect the licensee’s IR constraint, 
( )( )ee pxsp ,0* , thus if ( )( )[ ] 1*
*
),0(
),0(
p
pxsE
pxs
pp e
e
eo =≤ .  The definition of 2p  and 3p  is more involved, 
but essentially stems from the same logic.  Finally, 4p  is determined such that the optimal royalty rate 
equals the maximum allowable royalty rate. 
Figure 3.  Risk-averse licensor’s optimal single contract for different values of op  
Intuitively, one would expect that if the licensor knows with certainty that the licensee’s estimate will 
always be higher than his own, if eo pp ≤ , he will request a payment at contract signature only.  However, 
this is not necessarily the case: only if eo ppp <≤ 1  will the licensor request a payment at contract 
( )0,0,*0m ( )**0 ,0, rm ( )**1*0 ,, rmm ( )**1 ,,0 rmCase 1: 24 pp >  
0 1p ep  2p 3p 1
op
( )0,0,*0m ( )**0 ,0, rm ( )max*,0,0 rr =  Case 2: 24 pp ≤  
0 1p ep  4p  1
op
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signature only.  Indeed, if 1pp
o > , the licensor should offer a contract with a positive royalty rate, thereby 
incurring some risk.  The licensor does so because he cannot rule out that the licensee has a high estimate 
ep , and will therefore invest heavily in demand-enhancing activities, thus raising sales.  The only way to 
benefit from this upside is to include a royalty rate in the contract.  Hence we see that the licensor requests 
a positive royalty rate to reduce the negative effect of adverse selection through participation in the sales.  
Note that the optimal royalty rate is increasing in op : the more the licensor believes in the project, the 
more he is interested in participating in the upside potential.   
If the licensee’s reservation utility is not too high, i.e., if 24 pp >  (Case 1) and if the licensor’s estimate 
eo ppp >> 2 , he will introduce a milestone payment.  In that case, the difference between the licensor’s 
estimate op  and the lowest-type licensee’s PTS estimate makes it profitable for the licensor to ask for a 
milestone payment despite the increased risk exposure.  Finally, the licensor may be so optimistic about the 
project that he prefers not to take any payment at contract signature at all, namely if 3pp
o ≥ .  In Case 2, 
the upfront payment’s non-negativity constraint becomes binding as the optimal royalty rate increases in 
op , and a licensor with an estimate 4pp
o ≥  will ask for the maximum royalty rate and no upfront or 
milestone payment. 
Similar results are obtained for a risk-neutral licensor, with the exception that a risk-neutral licensor should 
not mix an upfront fee and a milestone payment except for eo pp = , when he may be indifferent between 
the two (see appendix).  The results are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Risk-neutral licensor’s optimal single contract for different values of op  
The licensor’s value is non-decreasing in the licensee’s type.  However, it is easy to see that it will not 
increase as fast as in the case without adverse selection, as all but the lowest-type licensee will receive 
more than their reservation utility. 
B.2.  Menu of Contracts 
The licensor can also offer a menu of contracts ( ))(),(),( 10 eee prpmpm  tailored for different licensee 
types.  In that case, the licensor has to ensure that the contracts are incentive compatible.  We rewrite the 
IC constraints (Eq. 9) using the first-order condition on the licensee’s optimal contract choice: 
(13) ( )( )( )[ ]eee peepep mpprxsrpm 1*0 , +−=   
Eq. (13) gives the relationship between the contract term functions 0m , 1m  and r  such that the licensee’s 
optimal choice will be to truthfully declare her type.  The optimal contract scheme can be implemented 
only if the licensee’s second-order conditions also hold. 
For a risk-averse licensor, we can only reach an analytical solution under certain conditions that guarantee 
an interior solution to the problem.  Indeed, non-negativity constraints on the contract terms are 
nonholonomic, complicating the analytical analysis (Hadley and Kemp, 1971).  However, we can compute 
the first-order conditions which are valid for an interior solution to the licensor’s problem (see appendix), 
equating the weighted marginal utility of the licensor’s payoff at project failure and project success: 
( )0,0,*0m ( )**0 ,0, rm ( )**1*0 ,, rmm ( )**1 ,,0 rmCase 1: epp >5  
0 1p ep  1
op
( )0,0,*0m ( )**0 ,0, rm ( )max*,0,0 rr =  Case 2: epp ≤5  
0 1p ep  5p  1
op
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(14) ( ) ( ) fs zooezoo uprpup −=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −− 111
1
. 
 
When the licensor is risk-neutral, we can solve the value maximization problem analytically using optimal 
control theory combined with our knowledge that, in the optimal contract, upfront payments and milestone 
payments should never be simultaneously included.  Let us define 0p  such that 
( )
( ) oppf
pFp =−−
0
0
0
1
.  
Then, the optimal menu of contracts can be described as follows (see appendix): 
• 0ppo ≤ : 0,0,0 **1*0 >≥= rmm ; the optimal royalties rate is non-increasing, and the milestone 
payment non-decreasing in ep . 
• ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) 0
1,01;
0
**
0 >−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+≥ =rpxe
e
eee
e
e
oo xs
pf
pFppxsp
pf
pFppp : 0,0,0 **1*0 >=≥ rmm ; 
the optimal royalty rate is non-increasing, and the upfront fee non-decreasing in ep . 
• ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) 0
1,01
0
** ≤−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+ =rpxe
e
eee
e
e
o xs
pf
pFppxsp
pf
pFp : 0,0 **1*0 ==> rmm ; the 
upfront payment remains constant. 
We can now make the following observations concerning the structure of the optimal contract.  First, we 
see that the optimal menu of contracts includes a royalty rate, which decreases the project value by 
reducing the licensee’s incentive to invest, resulting in a lower-than-optimal investment in demand-
enhancing activities.  The royalty rate is decreasing in the licensee’s type, to encourage the licensee to 
reveal her true value for the project: if the licensee believes in the project, she would prefer to invest 
heavily in demand-enhancing activities, and would be willing to pay a higher upfront or milestone payment 
in order to reduce the royalty rate, contrary to a low-type licensee, who is willing to bear the burden of a 
high royalty rate.  Note that the royalty rate serves a different purpose than in the single contract case: 
when the licensor offers a single contract, the royalty rate is used to receive a cash flow proportional to the 
licensee’s type; whereas in a menu of contracts the royalty rate is primarily designed to induce 
discrimination through its interaction with the licensee’s optimal level of demand-enhancing activities.  A 
menu of contracts is designed to penalize low-type licensees in order to encourage high-type licensees to 
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reveal their valuation, whereas the single contract, with its constant royalty rate, is proportionately more 
harmful to a high-type licensee than a low-type licensee. 
Second, we observe that as a consequence of adverse selection, the licensor’s expected value decreases.  
On the one hand, the licensor now bears an informational rent for all licensee types, except for the lowest.  
Informational rent is defined as the value the licensee obtains on top of her reservation utility.  The 
licensor’s and the licensee’s valuation of the informational rent may differ and the licensor’s valuation of 
the informational rent need not be strictly increasing in the licensee’s type.  Except for the lowest-type 
licensee, the licensor is now unable to reap the whole surplus above the reservation utility from the 
licensee, but rather has to reward the licensee for revealing her valuation of the project by offering contract 
terms leaving her strictly more than the reservation utility.  Moreover, the licensor accepts to lose value on 
low-type licensees in order to reduce the informational rent on high-type licensees.  Thus, even though the 
licensor can still extract the whole surplus from the lowest-type licensee, the project value, and the 
corresponding surplus, have become smaller because of the lower effort level, resulting from the non-zero 
royalty rate.   
Third, we note that the optimal menu of contracts may contain a range over which the licensor is less 
optimistic than the licensee but nonetheless asks for a milestone payment at project completion, despite the 
fact that the upfront payment of equivalent value to the licensee is higher than the licensor’s value of the 
milestone payment.  The licensor’s valuation of a unit of milestone payment is its expected value, op , plus 
the expected value of switching to an upfront payment for licensee types higher than op , who value the 
milestone higher and will offer a higher equivalent upfront payment.  The extra value balances the gain of 
switching for licensee types higher than 0p , occurring with likelihood )(1 0pF− , with the missed 
opportunity on the licensee type 0p , occurring with likelihood )( 0pf , taking into account how much the 
licensee is willing to pay in upfront fee for each unit of milestone payment, i.e., ep .  The licensor therefore 
not only chooses whether to ask for a milestone payment or an upfront payment based on the comparison 
of his valuation to the licensee’s, but also takes into account the expected value he forgoes by asking for 
the payment at contract signature at that particular licensee type rather than at a higher type. 
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Fourth, bunching, when the same contract is offered for different licensee types, can occur both for low-
type and for high-type licensees.  For low-type licensees, this occurs when the optimal royalty rate found in 
the range 0pp
e <  is higher than the maximum allowable royalty rate, i.e., a rate such that the non-
negativity constraints on the lump sum payments become binding.  For high-type licensees, bunching 
occurs if the non-negativity constraint becomes binding for the royalty rate.   
Fifth, we would like to point out the licensor’s limitation in manipulating the royalty rate to discriminate 
between the licensee types.  In the literature, adverse selection is usually tackled by the introduction of 
royalties (Gallini et al, 1990; Beggs, 1992).  However, proposition 1 suggests to contract directly on the 
licensee’s effort if possible: this yields better results than using royalties as the licensor can directly impose 
the desired investment level in demand-enhancing activities, which is independent of the licensee’s 
payment to the licensor.  In order to discriminate between licensee types, the licensor imposes investment 
levels lower than the licensee deems optimal, as a high-type licensee will then be willing to pay more in 
upfront or milestone payments to gain the right to invest appropriately in the project.  This contrasts with 
Desai and Srinivasan (1995), who show that manipulating the effort level is not efficient when the single-
crossing property does not hold.  Unfortunately, such a contract would be difficult to enforce as 
investments in demand-enhancing activities may be difficult to monitor.  Therefore, the licensor may have 
to resort to using a variable royalty rate.  The royalty rate has two effects: first, it influences the licensee’s 
incentive to invest and second, it results in a payment stream after successful project completion.  
However, we have seen that the licensor would prefer an upfront payment if the licensee’s type exceeds 
0p .  Therefore, for very high licensee types, the licensor may be better off to forego royalties and its 
discriminating power and ask for an upfront payment only.  Therefore, we notice that in the presence of 
adverse selection, moral hazard may compound the licensor’s value loss by preventing him to discriminate 
between the different types of licensees.  In that case, bunching occurs, and all the licensee types higher 
than a threshold level will be offered the same contract. 
On its own, a milestone payment does not significantly add to the licensor’s ability to discriminate between 
licensee types.  However, it is still a valuable contract element to add to the two-part tariff, because it 
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removes the need to use the royalty rate as a revenue generating tool, allowing to use it exclusively for the 
purpose of discrimination.  In a two-part tariff, the royalty is the only instrument capable of generating 
future cash flows.  However, imposing a high royalty rate can reduce the project value excessively, limiting 
the amount the licensor will receive in the future and may force him to propose an upfront payment, even 
though the licensor has a higher valuation for future payments than the licensee.  Adding the milestone 
payment alleviates this problem to a certain extent, as it becomes possible to delay revenue without 
impacting project execution. 
E.  Summary 
Table 2 summarizes the optimal contract structure under different conditions of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
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5.  Discussion and Conclusions 
Licensing contracts studied in the literature have evolved from contracts specifying a single element, either 
a fee or a royalty rate (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Beggs, 1992), through 
two-part tariff contracts (Shapiro, 1985; Macho-Stadler et al, 1996; Jensen and Thursby, 2001), to contracts 
with more elements (Thursby et al, 2005).  We show that a three-part tariff contract structure with a 
milestone payment is superior to the commonly studied two-part tariff.  Since a milestone payment might 
be valued differently by different licensee types, it can act as a discriminating element, without distorting 
the licensee’s incentives to invest in the project.  A milestone payment by itself, however, is ineffective at 
discriminating, especially for a risk-neutral licensor.  Thus, our analysis confirms the need for a royalty rate 
to fight adverse selection.  Nonetheless, milestone payments can be useful because they allow generating 
future cash flows without the incentive distortion resulting from a royalty rate. 
Our analysis studies the effect of adverse selection and moral hazard separately.  Under adverse selection, 
discriminating contracts act by manipulating the licensee’s effort level, preferably by contracting directly 
on it.  When this is not possible, i.e., in a hidden action model, a varying royalty rate can be used to induce 
a variable effort level, allowing discrimination between licensee types.  Adverse selection biases the 
optimal contract towards the use of a milestone payment: only under adverse selection does the licensor’s 
optimal contract include a milestone payment for licensee types with a higher PTS estimate than his own.  
Adverse selection reduces the licensor’s value through (a) the suboptimal effort level of the licensee and 
(b) the informational rent the licensor pays to the licensee (Salanié, 1997; Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  
Furthermore, adverse selection forces the risk-averse licensor to bear more risk by including an uncertain 
milestone payment more often than in the first-best case.  Consistent with Desai and Srinivasan (1995), our 
results confirm that moral hazard without adverse selection does not reduce the principal’s value.  
However, moral hazard added to adverse selection may decrease the licensor’s value if it leads to bunching 
and makes complete discrimination impossible. 
Each element in the contract structure serves a different purpose.  Lump sum payments have the advantage 
of not distorting the licensee’s incentive to invest, but only offer a limited scope to discriminate.  The 
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royalty rate enables the licensor to discriminate more extensively but distorts the licensee’s incentive to 
invest, decreasing the total project value.  In the case of a single contract, the royalty rate allows 
participating in the potential upside of signing with a high-type licensee.  In practice, we have observed 
that a licensor often prefers upfront payments, in order to avoid risk.  However, this may not be in the 
licensor’s benefit.  The licensee’s type, ep , impacts her valuation of the project and of the contract terms.  
If the licensee is of a low type, the licensor can exploit the difference in valuation by asking for a milestone 
payment, balancing the higher risk against the higher expected cash flow value.  Under informational 
asymmetry, the optimal set of contracts favors payments at project completion, both in the form of a 
milestone payment or a royalty rate.  A risk-averse licensor may offer contracts with both an upfront and a 
milestone payment.  We recommend that the licensor carefully craft the licensing contract with the 
respective contribution of all the contract terms in mind.  To summarize, we agree that “it is the 
combination of distortions that necessitates complex contracts” (Thursby et al, 2005).  However, our 
contract design suggestions are based on a stylized model of the real issue, and care must be taken before 
extrapolating our conclusions to situations where our assumptions do not apply. 
There are several avenues for further research.  One option would be to expand the model to projects with 
several research phases.  We expect that in that case the licensor will still differentiate amongst licensee 
types, using the trade-off between milestone payments and royalties to optimize his return depending on 
the licensee’s belief.  It will be challenging to solve because of the multi-dimensional nature of the 
licensee’s type (Salanié, 1997; Armstrong and Rochet, 1999; Rochet and Stole, 2001).  A second option 
would be to analyze the licensor’s optimal contracts when the licensor has his own reservation utility.  
Since the licensor can approach several licensees, he can determine a minimum PTS which the licensee 
should hold for him to consider offering a contract.  Another extension would allow the licensor to write 
more complex contracts, including, for example, non-linear royalty schemes, the opportunity for the 
licensor to provide continuing input in the R&D activities (Iyer et al., 2005).  Finally, we could look at the 
mirror image of this research, and analyze the licensee’s contract design problem, for those cases where it 
is more reasonable to assume that the licensee has the higher bargaining power. 
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